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Abstract 
Very little is known about how people understand abstract concepts. While a good deal is 
known about concrete concepts such as chair or apple, concepts that are perceptually 
elusive, such as idea or freedom, remain a challenge for theories of conceptual 
knowledge. Past research has explained how these concepts are understood by focusing 
on how they differ from concrete concepts, suggesting they are primarily understood by 
their relations to other words. However, recent research recognizes that this is not a 
comprehensive view of their representation, and that it excludes much of people’s 
everyday experience. Accordingly, current theories of grounded cognition propose that 
real-world situational knowledge plays a key role in how people understand abstract 
concepts. Experiment 1 supports this idea by showing that short scenario descriptions 
prime abstract concepts in the absence of any word association. In Experiment 2, I 
grouped concepts according to whether they relate multiple aspects of a situation, or refer 
to internal states. The former shows significant priming but the latter does not. These 
experiments demonstrate the importance of situational knowledge for the representation 
and processing of abstract concepts, including how the relationship between situations 
and abstract concepts is important to delineating among them. 
 
 
Keywords: Abstract concepts, Situational information, Semantic knowledge, Conceptual 
Act Theory 
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The Importance of Situational Information for Abstract Concepts 
Abstract concepts such as idea or freedom remain almost as much a challenge for 
theories of conceptual knowledge today as they were centuries ago. Indeed, despite quite 
a bit of research, these concepts are still not well understood. One relatively 
uncontroversial observation is that abstract concepts differ from concrete concepts such 
as chair or apple. And in fact, abstract concepts are typically defined as those that are not 
concrete, that is, “entities that are neither purely physical nor spatially constrained,” 
(Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings, 2005). Due to the comparison with concrete concepts, a 
primary focus of past research has been defining the differences between these two broad 
classes behaviourally and neurally with the goal of elucidating the mechanisms that are 
responsible for processing concepts that are essentially intangible. 
The majority of these attempts have taken the following approach. Abstract and 
concrete concepts are selected from established norms in which people rate them on a 
scale from one to seven, moving from abstract to concrete respectively (Paivio, 1986). 
These two groups are then compared on a range of tasks. Behavioural studies using words 
as stimuli have demonstrated that, compared to abstract concepts, concrete concepts are 
recognized faster in lexical decision tasks (Bleasdale, 1987; Whaley, 1978), remembered 
better in serial recall (Paivio, Yuille, & Smythe, 1966; Romani, McAlpine, & Martin, 
2007), and are read faster in naming studies (de Groot, 1989). These findings have led to 
the general conclusion that abstract concepts are more difficult to process than are 
concrete concepts, referred to as the concreteness effect. 
The majority of explanations of these effects have emphasized the role of 
language in the representation of abstract concepts, leaving little or no room for other 
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influences. The goal of the present thesis is to address abstract concepts from a somewhat 
different approach, one that emphasizes the role of real-world situational information. 
Specifically, I tested the hypothesis that providing situational information in the absence 
of direct linguistic relations (i.e., word association) primes abstract concepts. This must 
be the case given any theory in which situational knowledge is a key component of 
abstract concepts, such as Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbol Systems theory (1999). After 
establishing this basic but critical effect, I classified abstract concepts into two categories, 
relational and internal state, based on the aspects of situations to which they correspond. 
This classification is inspired by the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion (Barrett, 2006; 
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). I found significant situational priming for relational but 
not for internal state concepts. I interpret these results as demonstrating the importance of 
real-world situations for how people learn, represent, and use abstract concepts. 
In the remainder of the Introduction, I begin by discussing the dominant view of 
abstract concept processing, Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007), as well as its 
shortcomings. Following this, I review grounded theories of cognition and their accounts 
of abstract concepts, with focus on Conceptual Metaphor Theory (Lakoff & Johnson, 
1980) in particular. I conclude with Barsalou’s Perceptual Symbol Systems theory (1999) 
– a unique account that may hold promise for better understanding abstract concepts, and 
one I test in the Experiments that follow. 
Dual Coding Theory 
The most popular account of concreteness effects is Dual Coding Theory (DCT) 
(Paivio, 1986, 2007), which states that processing differences between abstract and 
concrete concepts result from representational differences in two brain systems, the 
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imagistic and verbal (linguistic) systems. Concrete concepts are represented in the 
imagistic system, which contains modality-specific information (visual, haptic, gustatory, 
etc.), as well as in the verbal system, which represents the relationships among words that 
frequently co-occur in language. In contrast, abstract concepts are represented only in the 
verbal system. 
The activation of these systems relies on the information predominantly included 
in them (modality-specific information versus linguistic information). Although they are 
separate, there are referential connections between them such that a concept’s linguistic 
form is connected to modality-specific information about its referent and vise versa. 
However, abstract concepts do not have physical perceptually-based referents, and 
therefore are not represented in the imagistic system. They are understood primarily via 
the linguistic system by virtue of their association to other words. 
Accordingly then, abstract concepts are more difficult to process due to the 
singular nature of their semantic representation. Whereas concrete concepts have two 
sources of knowledge available to them at all times, abstract concepts have only one. And 
indeed, there is a strong correlation between concreteness ratings and how imageable 
people believe a concept to be (Paivio, 1986). Furthermore, a number of fMRI studies 
have shown increased activation in left-hemisphere language regions, primarily the left 
IFG and MTG, for abstract compared to concrete concepts (Binder et al., 2005; Wang et 
al., 2010). These findings are taken to support a greater reliance on verbal processing for 
abstract concepts, and thus support predictions made by DCT. 
Yet, several findings remain that are not easily incorporated into this account. For 
example, there are instances in the literature that do not readily support the concreteness 
 4 
effect. In an edible/non edible judgment task, Pexman et al. (2007) found shorter decision 
latencies to abstract than to concrete concepts. Presumably this task depends on the type 
of deeper semantic processing that would, in fact, highlight a semantic processing 
advantage or disadvantage. Further, with other variables controlled, Kousta et al. (2011) 
obtained shorter lexical decision latencies for abstract than for concrete concepts. Finally, 
patients with deep dyslexia often have difficulty recognizing and pronouncing abstract 
words. However, Newton and Barry (1997) demonstrated that while these patients cannot 
physically annunciate them, they do show understanding of them in a task using pictures. 
Noteworthy in itself is the remarkable inconsistency of imaging data. In fact, a 
number of studies have produced findings that are not well explained by any theory, such 
as greater activation in the RIFG for abstract concepts (Rodriguez-Ferreiro et al., 2009). 
Furthermore, although a meta-analysis conducted by Wang et al. (2010) found that the 
left IFG was a common denominator across studies, it is not entirely clear what increased 
activation in the left IFG reflects. Although this finding is often taken as evidence that 
abstract concepts rely more on verbal information than do concrete concepts, the left IFG 
has been crucially implicated in other functions ranging from semantic selection and 
integration (Huang et al., 2012; Thompson-Schill et al., 1997) to response inhibition 
(Swick, Ashley & Turken, 2008), and even social perception (Keuken et al., 2011). 
Perhaps the most striking issue at hand is that there is currently no convincing 
account of what constitutes the conceptual representation of abstract concepts. Regarding 
DCT, it is difficult to imagine how the required richness of meaning could be derived 
from word association alone, as the word associates to many abstract concepts are 
themselves abstract. Whereas much research has recognized that word association alone 
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is insufficient (Pecher et al., 2011), we are still left with a definition that characterizes 
abstract concepts as being “not concrete,” with no compelling explanation otherwise. 
Grounded Cognition 
A substantial amount of insight into the human conceptual system has been 
provided by embodied or grounded cognition theories (Barsalou, 2010; Borghi & Pecher, 
2011). While there are several different theoretical variations of this school of thought, all 
argue that people understand concepts, to varying degrees, through modality-specific 
regions in the brain (Barsalou, 2010; Chaterjee, 2010). Whereas conceptual knowledge 
was formerly thought to be stored in amodal symbols, in grounded cognition theories, 
people’s understanding of a given concept instead makes use of modality-specific areas 
that process perception and action, and in this sense, are modal. For example, we 
understand kick via motor regions that are activated when we physically perform this 
action (Hauk, Johnsrude, & Pulvermuller, 2004). And indeed, there is an impressive body 
of research demonstrating this to be the case for concrete nouns and verbs (see Martin, 
2007, for a review). 
The amount of support for these ideas is almost indisputable regarding concrete 
nouns and verbs (Barsalou, 2010; Borghi & Pecher, 2011). However, the degree to which 
they provide insight into the representation and processing of abstract concepts is not 
entirely clear. While grounded theories state that all concepts, to some degree, are 
understood through modality-specific brain regions, it has long been assumed that 
abstract concepts do not have modality-specific features. The difficulty then is to 
determine whether abstract concepts be understood through such mechanisms. 
This challenge has prompted researchers to look for ways in which the motor and 
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perceptual systems of the brain could possibly represent abstract concepts. Research 
using this point of view has largely revolved around Conceptual Metaphor Theory, 
initially proposed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), but strongly advocated also by Gibbs 
(1992, 1994). According to Conceptual Metaphor Theory, abstract concepts are 
extensions of concrete relations that act as “vehicles.” For example, people understand 
the concept anger through analogy to heat or boiling water. Similarly, concrete 
relationships such as up/down, and left/right serve the basis for abstract relations such as 
good/bad. These basic concepts or primary metaphors create image schemas that allow 
people to think about abstract concepts in ways that are linked to sensory experiences, 
such as associating “good” with upward or rightward, and “bad” with leftward or 
downward. Similarly, time is viewed as moving from left to right, love as a journey, 
anger as heat, and so forth. 
Conceptual Metaphor Theory began with the recognition that we often use 
spatially-oriented words to describe abstract relations, such as “over the hill,” or “out of 
time,” but has since been tested beyond the realm of metaphorical language. Meier et al. 
(2007) demonstrated that positively valenced pictures (God-like images) are remembered 
better when they are presented at the top of a computer screen, whereas negatively 
valenced pictures (devil-like images) are remembered better when presented at the 
bottom. Also, handedness affects whether people see good or bad on the left or right side 
of space (Casasanto, 2009), the direction of an individual’s written language system 
affects what direction she conceptualizes time flow (Boroditsky, Fuhrman, & McCormic, 
2010), and the perception of time is influenced by spatial judgments (Casasanto & 
Boroditsky, 2008). Thus, it has been argued that concepts like valence and time are 
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grounded in spatial relations; people talk about them in spatial terms because they are 
extensions of previously established concrete spatial relations. 
Yet, there are several problems with these findings. For example, it is not clear 
what makes space a good candidate for time or valence. For an abstract concept domain 
to systematically map onto a concrete domain, it must have some initial structure or 
content (Chaterjee, 2010). If this was not the case, it is unclear how such mapping could 
possibly occur. Furthermore, although people may make use of spatial orientation to 
elaborate or enrich their understanding of abstract concepts, this may not be necessary in 
all conditions. The necessity of metaphorical mapping has indeed been called into 
question (Chatterjee, 2010). For example, there are dedicated neural circuits in the brain 
that process time, so it may be unnecessary to assume that people’s perception of spatial 
orientation is fundamental to understanding time when they already have mechanisms in 
place for doing so (Kranjec & Chatterjee, 2010). Finally, there are various abstract 
concepts for which there are no intuitive metaphorical mappings. Argument, decision, 
relief, and challenge, among many others, do not neatly correspond to spatial image 
schemas. In summary, whether metaphorical mapping is necessary is unclear, and the 
scope of abstract concepts it can possibly account for is limited. 
Perceptual Symbol Systems 
Another way in which abstract concepts could be grounded is in terms of sensory 
and motor experience. Perceptual Symbol Systems theory (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008) 
offers a unique account of how this may occur. Like most embodied accounts, Perceptual 
Symbol Systems theory claims that people understand concepts using the same modality-
specific areas that are involved in perception and action. For a given concept, modality-
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specific information is encoded in respective brain areas regarding what its referent looks 
like, feels like, moves like, and so on, and this state is captured by neural association each 
time we experience an instance of that concept. Accordingly, conceptual understanding 
stems from partial reenactment, or simulation, of these experiences, which creates a 
certain profile of brain activation. The simulations are never full in that it is not the case 
that all accumulated knowledge is reactivated, but rather, they are partial such that they 
are tailored to the constraints of a given circumstance. 
In Perceptual Symbol Systems theory, abstract concepts are represented through 
complex relations among objects, people, places, actions, as well as an individual’s 
internal environment (introspection, thought, bodily sensations, mentalizing, and so on). 
For simplicity’s sake, these forms of knowledge can be referred to as situational 
knowledge. Unlike Conceptual Metaphor Theory, abstract concepts do not extend 
directly from a single sensory dimension, but express complex relations among concepts 
that are still very much perceptual, and typically co-occur in situations that are actually 
experienced, or are heard or read about, over time. 
One important point highlighted by a situational-based view of abstract concepts 
is that concepts do not exist in a vacuum. That is, concepts are always part of an ongoing 
situation or context. In this sense, they are always situated; one cannot remove one’s self 
from situational contexts, and all concepts are processed within them. While concrete 
concepts are relatively local in time and space, abstract concepts are not. But this does not 
exclude them from being accessed through experience. Instead, abstract concepts rely on 
complex interactions that occur over space and time. And indeed, people express types of 
situational information when asked to provide item properties (their characteristics) or 
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contextual properties (relevant contexts) for abstract concepts. They provide properties 
expressing subjective experiences, especially situations related to social contexts 
(Wiemer-Hastings & Xu, 2005). Thus, people use situations to define abstract concepts. 
Furthermore, because abstract concepts are flexible in that they integrate aspects 
of situations over time, their meaning changes depending on context. To illustrate, 
consider the abstract concept advice. The concept of advice entails an agent, a patient, 
and a context that includes an exchange of information. Yet the semantics of advice 
changes depending on who is giving the advice (a friend, a therapist, a lawyer, a parent), 
who is receiving it, and the context in which the act is occurring (a school, an office, a 
court, a house). Because abstract concepts relate aspects of a situation, they are inherently 
more flexible and guided by situations and their respective elements (people, objects, 
actions, setting, etc., Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). In other words, whereas concrete 
concepts have situations as backgrounds (e.g., bread in your kitchen, a restaurant, or the 
supermarket), abstract concepts are aspects of the situation itself (Barrett et al., 2012). 
While both types of concepts individuate aspects of a situation to categorize the world 
around us in ways we can comprehend (Barsalou, 1999), abstract concepts are less 
specific and individuated because they are inherently relational. Logically then, the 
semantics of a given abstract concept is impoverished in isolation and can change 
substantially depending on context (Wilson-Mendenhall et al.). 
The Role of Situations 
Past research has tended to abstract concepts in isolation. It is well documented 
that context modulates behavioural effects in various ways (Barsalou 1982; Pecher & 
Raajimakers, 2004). Yet, regarding abstract concepts, the role of context has been largely 
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unexplored. One exception is Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2011), who looked at patterns of 
activation to the abstract concept observe when it was conceptualized as part of a 
physical threat or social threat situation. They demonstrated that when conceptualized as 
part of a scenario, observe elicited different profiles of activation than has been typically 
reported (left IFG, MTG). 
Importantly, activation profiles differed depending on context. In a social threat 
situation, observe showed more widespread activation in dorsal and ventral visual 
processing areas, as well as auditory regions bilaterally, whereas activation was much 
more constrained in the physical threat situation – with little overlap between them. Thus, 
Wilson-Mendenhall et al. (2011) concluded that an abstract concept is processed 
differently in the brain when it is part of a situational context, and this effect is mediated 
by the specific context in which it is processed, providing support for the idea that the 
semantics of a given abstract concept is largely guided by situational context. 
The idea that situational knowledge is important for how people represent abstract 
concepts is further supported by Ghio and Tettamanti (2010), who performed dynamic 
causal modeling on a previously published data set in which participants read action-
related sentences (e.g., “Now I push the button.”) or abstract sentences (e.g., “Now I 
appreciate the loyalty”). For action-related sentences, left hemisphere language areas 
were more functionally coupled with regions thought to subserve action representation 
(LSMG, LpITG). However, for abstract sentences, left-hemisphere language areas were 
more functionally coupled with areas thought to be involved in coding contextual 
information and monitoring introspective states (areas in the retrosplenial cortex). 
Ghio and Tettamanti (2010) interpreted their results as top-down, modality-
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specific reactivation of brain areas that process the semantics of both concept types. To 
understand sentences that describe actions, areas of the brain that process action are 
activated, whereas to understand sentences that involve abstract concepts like loyalty and 
appreciate, areas of the brain that process contextual information and introspective states 
are activated. Thus, regions that process introspective states and contextual information 
(which we generally term situational knowledge) may partially represent concepts like 
appreciate akin to how the motor system partially represents verbs like run. 
While the aforementioned studies provide support for a view in which situational 
information is paramount, this idea, at present, remains relatively unexplored. As stated 
by Pecher et al., (2011, p. 232), “Words for abstract concepts might activate specific, 
concrete situations that are instances of the concept or that provide a context for the 
concept. There is at present still very little evidence for this view.” A fundamental claim 
of theories that focus on the centrality of situational information is that abstract concepts 
are activated when situational information is provided. In a sense, this type of information 
could be conceptualized as the features of abstract concepts. So in the same way that 
providing “An animal with a tail that barks and is often a pet” should activate dog, so too 
should situational information activate an abstract concept. Crucially, this has not been 
demonstrated. 
Context Availability Theory 
One theory that has not been mentioned so far is Context Availability Theory 
(Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983). According to this theory, the difference between 
abstract and concrete concepts is due to differences in inherent context, such that people 
have greater difficulty generating contexts for abstract than for concrete concepts. While 
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abstract concepts do not necessarily occur in fewer contexts, those contexts are not as 
readily available. The majority of their research (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; 
Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988) has demonstrated that when a context is 
provided, abstract concepts are processed just as quickly as concrete concepts, thus 
eliminating the concreteness effect. 
This research is often cited in support of theories that emphasize the importance 
of context for abstract concepts. Yet, the context that Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1983) 
provided was a single sentence, such as “Science is the pursuit of truth.” Thus, upon 
closer inspection, their manipulation was actually designed to produce strong sentence-
final word expectancies, and careful inspection of their stimuli suggests an influence of 
phrasal priming (i.e., “pursuit of truth.”). It is possible that priming, in this respect, was 
due to the fact that the target, which was the final word of the sentence, was expected 
given a supportive sentence content (Stanovich & West, 1983). Critically, they did not 
provide the type of situational context that would lead one to conceptualize a 
circumstance as an instance of an abstract concept. 
The Present Study 
Abstract concepts are a particular challenge for theories of conceptual knowledge. 
Situational-based accounts hold insightful promise, but have rarely been tested (Pecher et 
al., 2011). Thus, the goal of the current research was to explore the idea that situational 
knowledge is important for how people understand and represent abstract concepts. 
Before proceeding, it is noteworthy to mention that all concepts used in the present thesis 
were abstract. The vast majority of past experiments included concrete words as well, so 
in this regard, I am purposely deviating from the way in which previous research on this 
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topic has typically been conducted. Although I believe that comparing these two concept 
types has been insightful, a frustrating aspect of this approach is that doing so often 
reiterates that they are, in fact, different types of concepts, without providing a 
convincing account as to why. For example, the concreteness effect is a well-established 
finding using various paradigms (Bleasdale, 1987; de Groot, 1989; Paivio, 1986; Romani, 
McAlpine, & Martin, 2007; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; Schwanenflugel, 
Harnishfeger, & Stowe, 1988; Whaley, 1978), yet it is still unclear as to why abstract 
concepts are harder to process than concrete ones, and why some tasks produce 
exceptions (Pexman et al., 2007). Importantly, because this type of research compares 
small sets of items taken from the very large classes of concrete and abstract concepts, it 
may obscure important aspects of the two classes. Therefore, the current research focuses 
entirely on abstract concepts, studying them in their own right rather than comparing 
them to concrete concepts, under the assumption that doing so will be insightful. 
The goal of Experiment 1 was to investigate whether situational knowledge does 
indeed activate abstract concepts. If it is the case that situational knowledge naturally 
elicits them, then abstract concepts should be primed when they are preceded by related 
scenario descriptions. In a sense, doing so follows the initial logic of Schwanenflugel and 
Shoben (1983), but more directly assesses the role of situational context. In this respect, 
results from Experiment 1 provide specific support for situational-based theories of 
abstract concept representation. 
I began by creating three-sentence scenarios that described various abstract 
concepts based on my intuition. For example, the following situation was created for 
advice: 
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School has been really difficult and stressful this year. You feel like maybe you should 
just give up and you want someone to talk to. You pick up your cell phone and call your 
best friend. 
Importantly, I ensured there were no word associates in the scenarios themselves 
to the abstract concepts of interest, ruling out the possibility that any priming might be 
due to word association. To validate intuitions about the relatedness between the abstract 
concepts and scenarios, a norming study was conducted in which participants rated 
relatedness on a scale from 1 (unrelated) to 7 (very related). Situation-concept pairs with 
high ratings were then used in a cross-modal priming study in which participants listened 
to the scenarios and then performed a visual lexical decision task. Unlike Schwanenflugel 
and Shoben (1983), the target abstract concept was not included as part of the scenario 
itself, eliminating the potential for both phrasal priming, and priming based on final word 
expectancy (Stanovich & West, 1983). Of interest was whether the same abstract concept 
was recognized faster when preceded by a related as opposed to an unrelated scenario. 
After obtaining priming using two timing intervals, I examined the relationship 
between the scenarios and the targets they primed. The claim that situational knowledge 
is important for abstract concept representation is broad in terms of what information, and 
for which concepts. Thus, I categorized the concepts from Experiment 1 based on the 
contingencies they expressed with respect to the situations that primed them. 
Additionally, research has seldom evaluated different types of abstract concepts. While 
concrete nouns have long been differentiated categorically (e.g., artifacts versus natural 
kinds; Keil, 1989), abstract concepts do not lend themselves well to categorization. With 
the exception of emotion concepts in select cases (Kousta et al., 2011), abstract concepts 
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have typically been treated a single group. Therefore, creating different types of abstract 
concepts based on their relations to situations is a novel contribution to research that 
provides further insight into the role of situations in understanding them. 
I used a distinction made by the Conceptual Act Theory of Emotion (Barrett et al., 
2006; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). Many concepts referred to internal states that a 
character would be feeling in the situation (e.g., depressed). Others, however, had less to 
do with internal states specifically, and more to do with the relationships among multiple 
aspects of the situation. For example, ignore describes an act, an agent performing this 
act, a patient being ignored, and so on, but one does not feel ignore internally. Thus, I 
divided concepts into two groups based on whether they referred to internal state or 
relational concepts, and investigated how situations differentially activated them. 
Internal state and relational concepts were matched on 13 variables concerning the 
relatedness between the situation and the abstract concept, situation length (number of 
words), emotional variables (arousal and valence), as well as target lexical variables 
(frequency, familiarity, etc.). Using the same procedure as Experiment 1, Experiment 2 
demonstrated that relational concepts showed significant situational priming whereas 
internal states did not. This effect was consistent at a 0 ms and a 500 ms ISI. A possible 
account of these findings, as well as their implications, are discussed in detail in the 
General Discussion. 
Situation Norming Study 
The purpose of this study was to empirically evaluate the relatedness of potential 
abstract targets to various situations. Participants read situation descriptions, and for each 
one, rated four to six abstract concepts based on how related they were to the situation. 
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Options consisted of potential targets, as well as unrelated abstract concepts that were 
included to anchor the scale. Abstract concepts with high ratings were then chosen as 
targets for Experiments 1 and 2. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario participated 
for $10 compensation. For all experiments presented in this thesis, all participants were 
native speakers of English, had normal-to-corrected normal visual acuity, and did not 
participate in more than one study. 
Materials 
Fifty-eight abstract concepts were selected from the MRC psycholinguistic 
database (Coltheart, 1981; Wilson, 1988; available online at 
http://www.psy.uwa.edu.au/MRCDataBase/uwa_mrc.htm). Scenarios thought to reflect 
instances of each abstract concept were created. For example, the following scenario was 
created for ignore. 
“You’re walking to get some food when you see a homeless man out of the corner of your 
eye. You do not turn your head. You keep walking.” 
Each situation was three-sentences in length and used second-person narrative (i.e., 
“you”). Research has demonstrated that second person narrative is effective at inducing 
perspective (Brunye et al., 2008), so I framed the situations as such to help participants 
immerse themselves in the scenarios as much as possible. Finally, situations were 
carefully constructed to avoid any words that were strongly associated to the hypothetical 
target. This was verified using Nelson, McEvoy, and Schreiber’s (1998) word association 
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norms. Therefore, no results in Experiments 1 or 2 could be explained by word 
association. 
A survey consisting of the 58 situations was employed. Each situation was paired 
with four to six abstract concepts. Participants were instructed to rate each concept based 
on its relevance to the situation, with “1” corresponding to “not relevant”, and “7” to 
“very relevant” (full instructions can be found in Appendix A). To ensure that 
participants provided a range of responses, at least one word option was intuitively 
unrelated to the situation to anchor scores. To control for order effects, four versions of 
the survey were created that balanced the order of situations and word options. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the survey in pencil-and-paper format. They were read 
instructions and asked to circle the appropriate response. Thus, responses were collected 
for each abstract concept in every scenario from 40 participants in total (10 for each 
version of the survey). The task took less than one hour to complete. 
Results 
Average relatedness ratings for each abstract concept for each of the 58 situations 
were calculated. Of the original 58 items, 48 situation-word combinations were selected 
(M = 6.40, SD = 0.23, range = 5.9 - 6.9). A criterion of at least 5.9 provided items for 
which almost all participants had given ratings of 5, 6, or 7. This value appeared to give a 
suitable balance of strong relatedness with the power provided by 48 items. All situation-
target pairs used in the present thesis can be found in Appendix B. 
Importantly, the selected situations did not have strong lexical associations to their 
target abstract concepts. I did not want the scenario to contain any words that were 
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strongly associated to the target (e.g., “happy” and “sad”), as it has been well documented 
that strongly associative words produce priming effects. To demonstrate that this was not 
the case, forward associative strength from the words in the scenario to the abstract target 
were obtained from the University of South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson et 
al., 1998). Of the 48 scenarios, only four contained words with nonzero forward 
associative strengths to the targets, and these were very low (range = .001 - .034). Thus, 
any obtained priming from the scenario to the target abstract concept could not be 
explained by associative relations. 
Target Word Norming Study 
The purpose of this study was to obtain scores for the abstract targets on several 
dimensions that have been shown to influence tasks involving abstract (and concrete) 
concepts. Of interest were concreteness, imageability, familarity, context availability, 
emotional arousal, and emotional valence. 
Concreteness captures the extent to which a concept is abstract or concrete on a 
scale from 1 (abstract) – 7 (concrete) whereas imageability refers to the ease with which a 
person can come up with an image for a particular concept on a scale from 1 (difficult) – 
7 (very easily). Imageability and concreteness are highly correlated, and often are used 
interchangeably. Context availability reflects how easily people can come up with a 
context for a given concept on a scale from 1 (difficult) to 7 (very easily). Familiarity 
refers to how familiar people believe a particular concept to be on a scale from 1 (not 
familiar) to 7 (very familiar). Valence refers to how negative or positive a given concept 
is, ranging from 1 (negative) – 9 (positive) with 5 being neutral. Similarly, arousal ratings 
capture how arousing people find a given concept to be on a scale from 1 (low arousal) to 
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9 (high arousal) with 5 being neutral. All of these scales express means multiplied by 
100, so if an average score is 6.34 for example, it is reported as 634. 
Norming the target concepts was important for several reasons. First, it was 
necessary to verify that they were indeed abstract. Previous research has classified 
abstract concepts as those with concreteness and imageability scores less than 400 
(Paivio, 1986; Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983; Schwanenflugel, Harnishfeger, & 
Stowe, 1988; Wiemar-Hastings & Xu, 2005), so this standard was followed. I also 
wanted concepts to be relatively familiar, as it is difficult to obtain priming to concepts 
that people do not use or understand. Finally, these ratings were critical for equating the 
groups that were compared in Experiment 2. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario participated 
for course credit. 
Materials 
All 48 target abstract concepts were rated alongside appropriate fillers on the 
dimensions of concreteness, imageability, familarity, context availability, emotional 
arousal, and emotional valence in an online survey (full instructions for all dimensions 
can be found in Appendix C). Appropriate fillers were used to anchor scores within each 
dimension. To illustrate, when participants rated concreteness, words with high and low 
concreteness according to the MRC Psycholinguistic database were included. Due to the 
length of the survey with all dimensions included, it was divided into two separate 
surveys. In one, participants rated concreteness, imageability and familarity, and in the 
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other, context availability, valence, and arousal were rated. 
Procedure 
Participants completed the norming study by signing on to a web-site. The 
instructions informed them that they were to rate various words according to different 
sets of instructions. Responses were collected from 20 participants per survey. The entire 
task took approximately half an hour. 
Results 
Mean ratings and standard errors on each dimension for the 48 target abstract 
concepts are presented in Table 1. The statistics for all of the stimuli were computed in 
the following way. For targets with values from existing databases (Altarriba, Bauer, & 
Benvenuto, 1999; Bird, Howard, & Franklin, 2000; Coltheart, 1981; Cortese & Fudgett, 
2004; Morrow & Duffy, 2005; Stadthagen-Gonzalez & Davis, 2006; Wilson, 1988), 
scores were averaged using those databases. For items that had not been normed 
previously, the values were taken from this study. Of relevance for Experiment 1, all 
items had concreteness and imageability scores less than 400. Thus, they are classified as 
“abstract.” The scores on all variables were further used in Experiment 2, and are 
discussed in more detail at that time. 
Experiment 1: Situational Priming 
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that situational information does indeed 
activate related abstract concepts. Specifically, it was predicted that participants would be 
faster to recognize an abstract word when it was preceded by, or primed by, a related as 
opposed to an unrelated scenario. For any theory in which situational information is 
central to the representation of abstract concepts, establishing a priming effect from 
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Table 1. Means and SEs for Target Concepts in Experiment 1. 
 
Variable M SE 
Concreteness 300 4 
Imageability  388 9 
Familiarity 567 5 
Valence 423 29 
Arousal 528 15 
Context Availability 459 11 
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situations to abstract concepts is fundamental. Because no experiments of this type have 
been conducted previously, and because it might take some time for abstract concepts to 
be activated by situations, I conducted the experiment using a 0 ms interval between the 
acoustic offset of the situation and the onset of the visually-presented target word 
(Experiment 1a), as well as a 500 ms interval (Experiment 1b). 
Experiment 1a 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-four undergraduate students at the University of Western Ontario 
participated for compensation of $15. 
Materials 
The 48 situation-word combinations were split into two rotation groups (24 per 
group). Within each rotation group, scenarios and targets were shuffled to create 
unrelated pairings. Two lists were constructed, with each containing 24 related situation-
concept pairs from one rotation group, and 24 unrelated situation-concept pairs from the 
other (and vice versa). In addition, 24 unrelated situation-word pairs created by the 
experimenter were included, for a total of 72 word targets overall. Thus, the relatedness 
proportion was .33 (i.e., the proportion of word targets preceded by related situations). 
Previous research has demonstrated that relatedness proportion can moderate priming 
effects, such that priming is facilitated as the proportion of related prime-target pairs 
increases (Stolz & Neely, 1995). According to Neely (1991), a relatedness proportion of 
less than .33 is deemed low. The remaining 50% (72) of the items were situations paired 
with pronounceable nonwords (e.g., “pluish”). Prior to the experiment, participants 
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completed 18 practice trials. Proportions of target types were identical to those used in 
the experiment itself. In total, the experiment consisted of 144 trials. 
Procedure 
Participants listened to the situations over headphones, following which a lexical 
decision was performed. The letter strings (i.e., words and nonwords) were displayed 
using E-Prime v2.1 on a PC with a 15-inch colour monitor. Letter strings were displayed 
in 24 Arial font and centered on a white screen. Participants made responses using a 
Psychological Software Tools serial-response box (Model 200A), which provided 
millisecond accuracy. 
Participants were instructed to listen to the scenarios, and then decide as quickly 
as possible while maintaining accuracy whether or not the presented stimulus was an 
English word by pressing a button for “yes,” or a button for “no.” They used their 
dominant hand for “yes” responses. Each trial began with a fixation cross (+), which 
remained on the screen during the entire acoustically-presented situation. Immediately at 
the offset of the last word, a letter string was presented. The letter string remained on the 
screen until participants made their response. Following a 500 ms interval, a simple 
comprehension question regarding the previous scenario was displayed on the screen. 
Participants were asked to answer “yes,” if it was true, or “no” if it was false using the 
same buttons. Comprehension questions were included to ensure that participants were 
paying attention to the scenarios, and were not intended to be difficult. The entire task 
took approximately 45 minutes. 
Design 
Decision latencies were analyzed using two-way analyses of variance. Of interest 
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was comparing the target abstract concepts when they were preceded by a related versus 
an unrelated situation. Relatedness was within participants (F1) and within items (F2). 
List was included as a between-participants dummy variable and item rotation group as a 
between-items dummy variable to stabilize variance that may have resulted from rotating 
participants and items over the two lists (Pollatsek & Well, 1995). The square root of the 
number of errors for each condition was also analyzed (Myers, 1979). 
Prior to analyses, decision latencies longer than three standard deviations above 
the grand mean were replaced by this value (1.3% of trials). Trials in which a lexical 
decision error was committed were excluded from decision latency analyses. Four 
participants had mean decision latencies greater than three standard deviations above the 
mean for critical trials, and were thus excluded from the analyses. 
Results 
Lexical decision latencies were 49 ms shorter when preceded by a related (M = 
719 ms, SE = 74 ms) versus an unrelated situation (M =768 ms, SE = 81 ms), F1(1, 38) = 
15.54, p < .001, F2(1, 46) = 15.15, p < .001. Error rates did not differ significantly 
between related (M = 1.9%, SE = .001%), and unrelated (M = 2.7%, SE = .002%) 
conditions, F1(1, 38) < 1, F2(1, 46) = 3.36, p = .07. Comprehension question accuracy 
rates showed that all participants attended to the scenarios (M = 92%, range = 80 - 98%). 
Experiment 1b 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario 
participated for course credit. 
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Materials 
The stimuli were identical to Experiment 1a. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 1a, except the duration of time 
between the offset of the last word in each acoustically-presented scenario and the onset 
of the lexical decision target was 500 ms. 
Design 
Analyses were identical to Experiment 1a. Two participants were omitted for 
having overall mean decision latencies longer than 3 standard deviations above the grand 
mean. Decision latencies greater than three standard deviations above the grand mean 
were replaced with that value (1.6% of trials). 
Results and Discussion 
Similar to Experiment 1a, lexical decision latencies were 73 ms shorter when 
preceded by a related (M = 759 ms, SE = 27 ms) versus an unrelated situation (M = 812 
ms, SE = 36 ms), F1(1, 26) = 14.65, p < .002, F2(1, 46) = 13.10, p < .002. Error rates did 
not differ significantly between the related (M = 1.2%, SE = 0.001%) and unrelated (M = 
1.5%, SE = 0.001%) conditions, F1(1, 26) < 1, F2(1, 46) = 1.42, p = .24. Comprehension 
question accuracy was again quite high (M = 93%, range = 67 - 100%). 
Acoustically-presented scenario descriptions primed abstract concepts in both 
Experiments 1a and 1b, an effect that cannot be explained by word association alone 
because forward associative strength was virtually nonexistent. These results strongly 
support theories that claim that part of the way in which people learn, use, comprehend, 
and represent abstract concepts involves information beyond lexical co-occurrence, and 
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rather, extends to a broader situational level. Experiment 1 involved situations that were 
common for, and relevant to, undergraduates, and that were expressed in terms of normal 
conversational tone as much as possible. To my knowledge, this is the first demonstration 
that providing people with situation descriptions activates abstract concepts – a finding 
that is critical for accounts that claim situational knowledge is important. 
With this basic priming effect established, I further examined the relationship 
between the scenarios and the target concepts they primed to better understand the nature 
of situational-based priming. While previous research speaks to situational information as 
being important (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008), this claim is somewhat underspecified. 
Past research has gained tremendous insight by looking at the types of relationships 
between concepts that express priming, such as whether they are thematic, or occur 
together in the same situation, or are members of the same category (McRae, Khalkhali, 
& Hare, 2012; Lucas, 2000). Logically then, the relationship between the provided 
information and an abstract concept is likely to be important, but remains unexplored. 
To begin, I examined the relationship between the abstract concepts and the 
situations used to prime them. One obvious category that arose was concepts that referred 
to internal states, or emotions that the character “you” in the narrative could be feeling. 
For example, the following situation was used for relief: 
You’re walking home from school when you realize you don’t have your laptop. You must 
have left it at school. You run back and find it exactly where you left it. 
Relief in this example specifically refers to the internal state of the protagonist. 
Conversely, other concepts had less to do with internal states specifically, and more to do 
with integrating multiple aspects of the situation cohesively. For example, the following 
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situation was used for ignore: 
You’re walking to get some food when you see a homeless man out of the corner of your 
eye. You do not turn your head. You keep walking. 
Ignore in this example incorporates specific actions, an agent performing this act, a 
patient receiving this act, and the combination of all of these aspects of the situation, but 
“you” do not feel ignore as a coherent singular internal state. These types of concepts are 
more congruent with Wilson-Mendenhall et al.’s (2011) view that many abstract concepts 
are relational structures that integrate various aspects of a scenario. For this reason, they 
were termed relational. 
Interestingly, the distinction between concepts that relate aspects of a situation 
and those that refer to internal states is discussed in a recent theory of emotion called the 
Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett 2006; Wilson-Mendenhall, 2011). According to this 
theory, as a situation unfolds, information (objects, actions, environmental settings, 
internal sensations, etc.) projects onto concepts in parallel, all of which compete to 
categorize the situation at hand. Relational organization, or integration of situational 
information, occurs first, and then produces an internal state. For example, a situation is 
recognized as danger, which in turn produces fear. 
While the Conceptual Act Theory is discussed in more detail below, I was curious 
as to whether this basic distinction would manifest in behavioual differences. The goal of 
Experiment 2 was to investigate situational priming with these two groups of items, 
relational and internal state, to determine whether differential priming effects would be 
obtained. If these types of abstract concepts can be distinguished empirically, it would 
provide evidence for a situationally-based distinction while further specifying the nature 
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of situational priming more generally. 
Experiment 2: Internal State versus Relational 
The goal of Experiment 2 was to determine whether situations differentially 
activate relational and internal state concepts. At least two outcomes were possible. First, 
if situations must be categorized before internal states are then produced, when the ISI 
between the situation and the target is 0 ms, there could be priming for relational but not 
internal state concepts. On the other hand, with a 0 ms ISI, the auditory situation unfolds 
over three sentences, and so it is perhaps the case that this time interval is sufficient for 
both types of concepts to be activated, thus producing priming in both conditions. 
Experiment 2a 
Method 
Participants 
Forty-two undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario 
participated for $10 compensation. 
Materials 
Of the 48 situation-target pairs from Experiment 1, abstract concepts that referred 
to internal states and relational components were selected. Thirty-two situation-concept 
pairs were included (16 relational and 16 internal state). These two item groups were then 
equated on 13 variables (statistics are presented in Table 2). Importantly, relatedness 
ratings between the scenario and the target concept did not differ between groups, so it is 
not the case that one concept type was rated as being more relevant to the situation than 
the other. The groups also did not differ significantly on lexical variables such as the 
length of the scenarios, nor the number of letters, phonemes, syllables or frequency of the  
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Table 2. Means and SEs for Relational and Internal State Concepts and Related 
Statistics. 
 
 Holistic Internal t(30) p-value 
Variable M SE M SE   
Situation Rating 6.46 0.05 6.40 0.07 0.71 .48 
Situation Words 33.1 2.0 29.0 1.9 1.52 .14 
Letters 7.1 0.7 7.4 0.7 0.33 .75 
Syllables  2.3 0.3 2.1 0.3 0.48 .64 
Phonemes  5.9 2.6 5.9 2.3 0 1.0 
ln(BCN Frequency) 7.72 0.36 7.68 0.89 0.10 .92 
Concreteness  286 21 295 7 0.41 .68 
Imageability 354 29 390 13 1.14 .26 
Familiarity  530 36 530 36 0.01 .99 
Valence  466 51 364 47 1.47 .15 
Absolute Valence  186 18 219 16 1.35 .19 
Context Availability 438 31 468 9 0.93 .36 
 
Note: All comparisons were non-significant at p > .05. 
 
 30 
target words, all of which have been shown to influence lexical decision latencies. 
Finally, words rated high on valence and arousal (Kousta et al., 2011), context 
availability (Schwanenflugel & Shoben, 1983), concreteness and imageability (Paivio, 
2007) are typically recognized faster in lexical decision tasks. The internal state and 
relational concepts did not differ on these dimensions either. Balancing groups on the 
aforementioned factors ensured that any obtained differences in priming effects were the 
product of the semantic relationship between the concept and the scenario. 
The 32 items were evenly split into two rotation groups. As in Experiment 1, 
abstract concepts were re-paired with situations in each rotation group to create unrelated 
pairings. For unrelated items, holistic concepts were paired with internal scenarios and 
vise versa. Two lists were then created. Each contained the related situation-word pairs 
from one rotation group, and unrelated situation-word pairs from the other. To verify that 
unrelated targets were equally unrelated for both groups, 40 participants rated the 
relatedness between the matched unrelated target and the scenario for all 32 abstract 
concepts in an identical fashion to the original situation norming study. This was done to 
ensure that any obtained differences in priming effects would not be due to the unrelated 
condition being less related to the scenario. Unrelated targets for relational concepts (M = 
2.34, SE = 0.17) did not differ in relatedness from internal state concepts (M = 2.40, SE = 
0.14), t(30) = 0.30, p = .78. 
Fillers with word targets were created so that 50% of the lexical decision targets 
were words (n = 64), of which 16 were related targets, 16 were unrelated targets, and 32 
were unrelated fillers. Thus, the relatedness proportion was .25. The other 50% of targets 
(n = 64) were situation-nonword pairs from Experiment 1. Participants completed the 
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same practice trials used in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. 
Design 
Decision latencies to lexical decision targets were analyzed using three-way 
analyses of variance, both by-participants (F1) and by-items (F2). Of interest were two 
factors: relatedness (related versus unrelated) and concept type (relational versus internal 
state). For the participants analyses (F1), both relatedness and concept type were within-
participants variables, whereas for items analyses (F2), relatedness was within items but 
concept type was between items. List and item rotation group again were included in the 
by-participants and by-items analyses respectively. The square root of the number of 
errors for each condition was analyzed separately using the same procedure. Decision 
latencies greater than three standard deviations above the grand mean were replaced with 
that value (1.6% of trials). 
Results and Discussion 
Lexical decision latencies and error rates for each condition are presented in Table 
3. For decision latencies, the relatedness by concept type interaction was significant by 
items, F2(1, 28) = 5.66, p < .05, and marginally significant by participants, F1(1, 40) = 
3.50, p = .07. The marginally significant effect by participants likely reflected the high 
variability in decision latencies across individual participants; variability was lower 
across items. Planned comparisons evaluating the effect of relatedness for each concept 
type revealed that relational concepts were recognized 106 ms faster when primed by a 
related versus an unrelated situation,  
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Table 3. Mean Decision Latencies (ms) and Percentage of Errors by Condition in 
Experiment 2a 
 
 Relational 
 
Internal State 
 M SE M SE 
Latencies (ms) 
 
   Unrelated 
 
 
932 
 
 
51 
 
 
882 
 
 
48 
 
   Related  
 
826 
 
47 
 
868 
 
52 
 
   Priming Effect 
 
106* 
 
 
 
14 
 
 
 
Percent Errors 
 
   Unrelated 
 
 
 
1.9 
 
 
 
0.03 
 
 
 
1.6 
 
 
 
0.04 
 
   Related 
 
2.5 
 
0.06 
 
0.9 
 
0.003 
 
   Priming Effect 
 
-0.6 
 
 
 
1.1 
 
 
 
Note: * = significant by participants and items 
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F1(1, 77) = 11.43, p < .002, F2(1, 28) = 15.87, p < .0006. In contrast, for internal state 
concepts, there was a non-significant 14 ms difference between the related and unrelated 
conditions, F1(1, 77) < 1, F2(1, 28) < 1. 
Given the apparent differences between relational and internal state concepts in 
each of the related and unrelated conditions, I also tested the effect of concept type at 
each level of relatedness. However, the relational and internal state concepts did not 
differ significantly in the unrelated, F1(1, 77) = 3.13, p = .08, F2(1, 52) = 2.55, p = .12, or 
related conditions, F1(1, 77) = 2.24, p = .14, F2(1, 52) = 2.51, p = .23. 
Replicating the effect demonstrated in Experiment 1a and 1b, abstract concepts 
overall were recognized faster when preceded by a related (M = 847 ms, SE = 47 ms) 
versus an unrelated situation (M = 907 ms, SE = 47 ms), F1(1, 40) = 9.28, p < .005, F2(1, 
28) = 10.42, p < .004. This suggests that the relatedness effect in Experiment 1 was 
carried largely by the relational abstract concepts. There was no significant overall 
difference between relational (M = 879 ms, SE = 47 ms) and internal state concepts (M = 
875 ms, SE = 47 ms), F1(1, 40) < 1, F2(1, 28) < 1. Finally, for error rates, there was no 
main effect of relatedness, F1(1, 40) < 1, F2(1, 28) < 1, or concept type F1(1, 40) < 1, 
F2(1, 28) < 1, nor was there a significant interaction between these two factors, F1(1, 40) 
= 1.72, p = .25, F2(1, 28) < 1. Comprehension question accuracy was again quite high (M 
= 91.5%, range = 81 - 97%). 
In Experiment 2a, the type of abstract concept interacted with situation-concept 
relatedness such that a large significant priming effect was found for relational abstract 
concepts, whereas a small nonsignificant effect was found for internal states. These 
results further support the idea that situational knowledge is an important component of 
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abstract concepts. In addition, they show that categorizing abstract concepts in terms of 
how they correspond to aspects of a situation is a promising theoretical approach, and a 
potentially fertile avenue of further investigation.  
Experiment 2b 
According to the Conceptual Act Theory, relational abstract concepts are 
organizing structures that in turn, produce internal states. One possibility then is that the 
nonsignificant priming effect for internal state concepts is a matter of timing. That is, at a 
0 ms ISI, relational concepts are activated, but internal states are not yet activated to a 
degree that produces significant priming. Therefore, I investigated whether after a longer 
ISI, internal state concepts would show similar priming effects to relational concepts. 
This was evaluated in Experiment 2b by extending the ISI from 0 to 500 ms. 
Method 
Participants 
Forty undergraduate students from the University of Western Ontario participated 
for course credit. 
Materials 
The stimuli were identical to Experiment 2a. 
Procedure 
The procedure was identical to Experiment 2a, except the duration of time 
between the offset of last word in each acoustically-presented scenario and onset of the 
lexical decision target was 500 ms. 
Design 
Analyses were identical to Experiment 2a. Four participants were omitted for 
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having an overall mean decision latency longer than 3 standard deviations above the 
grand mean. Decision latencies greater than three standard deviations above the grand 
mean were replaced with that value (1.8% of trials). 
Results and Discussion 
Lexical decision latencies and error rates for each condition are presented in Table 
4. For decision latencies, in contrast to Experiment 2a, the relatedness by concept type 
interaction was nonsignificant, F1(1, 34) = 1.26, p = .27, F2(1, 28) < 1. Planned 
comparisons were conducted to explore the effect of relatedness at each level of concept 
type. Replicating Experiment 2a, decision latencies for relational concepts were a 
significant 53 ms shorter when preceded by a related versus an unrelated situation, F1(1, 
67) = 4.50, p < .04, F2(1, 28) = 6.04, p < .03. Also as in Experiment 2a, there was a 
nonsignificant relatedness effect (27 ms) for internal state concepts, F1(1, 67) = 1.17, p = 
.28, F2(1, 28) = 1.45, p = .24. It is noteworthy that the differences in priming effects was 
stronger in Experiment 2a, as evidenced by the significant interaction. In Experiment 2b, 
the interaction was nonsignificant, although the pattern of planned comparisons was the 
same. 
I again compared the effect of concept type for each level of relatedness. 
Relational and internal state concepts did not differ in the unrelated condition, F1(1, 67) < 
1, F2(1, 43) < 1. For related situation-abstract concept pairs, decision latencies for 
relational concepts were significantly shorter than for internal state concepts by 
participants, F1(1, 67) = 4.29, p < .05, although not by items, F2(1, 43) = 1.18, p = .28. 
Again replicating the overall situational priming effect, decision latencies for 
abstract concepts were 40 ms shorter when preceded by a related (M = 725 ms, SE = 30  
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Table 4. Mean Decision Latencies (ms) and Percentage of Errors by Condition in 
Experiment 2b 
 Relational 
 
Internal State 
 M SE M SE 
Latencies (ms) 
 
   Unrelated 
 
 
761 
 
 
35 
 
 
769 
 
 
39 
 
   Related  
 
708 
 
29 
 
742 
 
33 
 
   Priming Effect 
 
53* 
 
 
 
27 
 
 
 
Percent Errors 
 
   Unrelated 
 
 
 
2.3 
 
 
 
0.02 
 
 
 
0.1 
 
 
 
0.001 
 
   Related 
 
1.6 
 
0.01 
 
1.6 
 
0.01 
 
   Priming Effect 
 
0.7 
 
 
 
-1.5 
 
 
 
Note: * = significant by participants and items 
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ms) versus an unrelated situation (M = 765 ms, SE = 36 ms), F1(1, 34) = 9.26, p < .004, 
F2(1, 28) = 6.54, p < .02. There was no significant difference between relational (M = 734 
ms, SE = 31 ms) and internal state concepts (756 ms, SE = 35 ms), F1(1, 34) = 3.25, p = 
.08, F2(1, 28) < 1. For error rates, there was no main effect of relatedness, F1(1, 34) < 1, 
F2(1, 28) < 1, nor concept type F1(1, 34) < 1, F2(1, 28) < 1, nor was there a significant 
interaction between these two factors, F1(1, 34) = 1.96, p = .17, F2(1, 28) = 1.06, p = .31. 
Finally, comprehension question accuracy was high (M = 89%, range = 80 - 98%). 
At two timing intervals, relational concepts demonstrated significant situational 
priming whereas internal state concepts did not. Thus, it appears as though when grouped 
separately, only concepts that integrate multiple aspects of the scenario are activated by 
situation descriptions. One possible explanation of the results obtained in Experiment 2 is 
that I happened to choose good situational exemplars for relational concepts, but not 
internal state. Although relatedness ratings did not differ between the two concept types, 
in the initial relatedness norming study, participants rated a set of concepts that I had 
chosen based on intuition. Therefore, it is possible that although participants may judge a 
situation and concept as highly related based on the provided items, there might be 
concepts that are more highly related, or better exemplars of the situation. 
As internal state concepts are subjective internal feelings, perhaps the concepts I 
provided differ from what people would have actually provided if given the opportunity. 
To examine this possibility, I conducted a production study in which participants read the 
situations and then produced concepts that they believed were related. 
Forty-four undergraduate students from the University of Western completed an 
online survey for course credit. They were instructed to read each of the 32 scenarios 
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used in Experiment 2 and provide 2 (minimum) to 5 (maximum) concepts they believed 
were related or representative of the situation in order of relevance (full instructions can 
be found in Appendix D). 
Responses were rank summed according to the order in they were produced by 
participants. Therefore, each concept was given a score based on the number of people 
who reported it according to the following formula: W = 5a + 4b + 3c + 2d + e, where a, 
b, c, d, and e, refer to the number of participants who provided that response in ranks 1, 2, 
3, 4, and 5 respectively. Words that were different forms of the same concept were 
combined based on the highest rank sum. For example if relief had a score of 46 and 
relieved had a score of 24, they were combined as relief with a total score of 70. 
Interestingly, in direct contrast to the results of Experiment 2, the mean rank sum 
for internal state concepts (M = 86, SE = 13.6, range = 7 – 171) was significantly higher 
than for relational concepts (M = 2.62, SE = .85, range = 0 – 9), t(16) = 6.12, p < .001. 
For internal state concepts, the target used in Experiment 2 was within the top 5 ranked 
concepts 81% of the time; for the 16 items, 8 targets were produced as the first ranked, 3 
as the second, 1 as the third, and 1 as the fifth. Conversely, for relational concepts, seven 
out of 32 (44%) were never produced by participants, and thus had rank sums of zero. Of 
those that were produced, the scores were very low (range excluding zero = 1 – 9). 
Overall, participants predominantly produced internal state concepts. Of all 32 
scenarios, the top 5 words were exclusively internal state for 28 of them. For the 
remaining scenarios, 3 contained 4 internal state words and 1 relational concept, and 1 
contained 3 internal state words and 2 relational concepts. Thus, when participants were 
given the scenario descriptions and asked to provide related concepts, they tended to 
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provide concepts referring to emotions they would be feeling in the situation, but rarely 
reported relational concepts. Furthermore, the initially chosen target was included in the 
top-five ranked responses 81% of the time for internal state concepts. Relational 
concepts, on the other hand, were either not reported, or reported rarely, as reflected by 
their low rank sums. 
Thus, when given the opportunity to provide related concepts with an unspecified 
amount of time to do so, people strongly tended to produce internal state concepts as 
opposed to relational concepts. Furthermore, these were fairly congruent with the internal 
state concepts used in Experiment 2 – and at very least, much more so than relational 
concepts. Therefore, it is not the case that the internal state concepts I initially selected 
were poor situational exemplars. If anything, it is the other way around, as the relational 
concepts were hardly reported at all. 
A puzzling aspect of these findings is that in both Experiments 2a and 2b, internal 
state concepts, despite being salient as measured by the production and rating studies, did 
not show significant situational priming effects, whereas relational concepts, which were 
rarely reported, did. Though the priming effect for internal state concepts was not zero in 
either case, and was more pronounced with a longer timing interval, it failed to reach 
significance. 
One possible explanation for these results involves semantic specificity and the 
variability of subjective internal states more generally. As a situation unfolds, it is 
categorized conceptually. That is, actions, objects, agents, patients, and so forth project 
onto concepts in parallel; this conceptualization process involves memory representations 
(similar situations experienced in the past) merging with the presented information 
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(Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011). From a theoretical standpoint, this is akin to accounts 
of discourse processing that emphasize a broader situation model that is built upon and 
updated with incoming information. Working memory is inherently linked to situation 
models such that relevant components of the unfolding situation must be maintained and 
updated to achieve a cohesive, comprehensible representation (Radvansky & Copeland, 
2001). 
As incoming information is categorized, and a situation model is built, internal 
states tied to concepts are presumably activated as part of this process. Yet arguably, they 
are not activated in a consistent fashion across individuals. To illustrate, consider the 
following scenario description: 
You have recently entered a chess tournament through school. You are an experienced 
chess player and your first match is against a classmate who you have previously 
competed against and lost the title of defending champion to. Since then, you've been 
practicing and feel confident that this will be a close match. 
According to the production study, the top ranked responses were nervous, 
confident, excited, anxious, and determined. That is, while some people conceptualized 
the situation as one in which they feel confident and excited, others were nervous and 
anxious. Likewise, consider the following scenario: 
You just finished writing a test. It took you only half an hour. You barely studied but knew 
almost all of the answers. 
Again, participants provided internal state concepts, the top six being relieved, happy, 
nervous, confident, excited, and scared. A similar trend exists such that some participants 
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reported feelings of relief, happiness, and excitement, where others, presumably believing 
that even an easy test is problematic when one did not study, felt nervous and scared. 
Because internal state concepts are subjective, they differ from individual to 
individual. This no doubt introduces variability, such that same internal state concept 
could be activated or primed for one person but not the next. Another way to think about 
the issue at hand concerns how the semantics of a given abstract concept can move from 
objective (external) to subjective (internal) content. Relational concepts appear to be 
more objective. Concepts such as competition are less debatable situationally; a chess 
tournament is an instance of competition. But internal state concepts are subjective 
emotions that are not necessarily fixed. How one feels about a competition depends on 
various factors and experiences that could lead one to feel excited and confident or 
nervous and scared. 
If this is correct, it is not the case that situational content does not activate internal 
state concepts. Rather, the variability in the internal state concepts that are activated by a 
given scenario obscures a uniform priming effect for them, introducing variability that 
leads to a null effect. If one could tailor the internal state concepts felt by each individual 
on a person-by-person basis, presumably significant priming could be obtained. 
General Discussion 
Abstract concepts have puzzled researchers for decades. How we understand 
concepts that do not have explicit physical properties, and what the semantic structure of 
such concepts could possibly be if we cannot directly experience them, is a challenge for 
theories of conceptual knowledge. Dual Coding Theory (Paivio, 1986, 2007) states that 
abstract concepts are represented primarily through the verbal system via words that co-
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occur together in language. In essence, we understand the concept idea as a cumulative 
set of relations among thought, light, concept, etc. However, it has been recognized that 
this account is not comprehensive, based on fMRI data that shows contradictory profiles 
of activation (Rodriguez-Ferreiro et al., 2009), results from patient studies and healthy 
individuals that produce exceptions (Newton and Barry, 1997; Pexman et al., 2007), and 
the fact that word associates to abstract concepts are often abstract themselves. 
In Perceptual Symbol Systems theory (Barsalou, 1999), all concepts loosely 
organize information and are represented using the same modality-specific areas involved 
in perception and action. That is, people understand concepts through partial simulations 
using relevant brain areas that encode information about a given concept learned through 
continued experience. While abstract concepts do not have prototypic modality-specific 
features (i.e., visual and haptic properties such as texture, colour, and shape, or motor 
properties), they are understood through simulations of entire situations that have been 
stored in memory. 
While this idea has been relatively unexplored, support is offered by Ghio and 
Tettamanti (2010) who demonstrated that passively viewing an abstract sentence leads to 
left-hemisphere language areas being more functionally coupled with areas thought to be 
involved in coding contextual information and monitoring introspective states (areas in 
the retrosplenial cortex). The retrosplenial cortex has a well-established role in episodic 
memory (see Vann, Aggleton & Maguire, 2009, for review). Thus, when people are 
provided with abstract sentences, there appears to be activation of areas that encode 
contextual and internal state information. 
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The current set of Experiments examined the same process in reverse. Instead of 
providing people with a concept and looking at the types of information that are 
important, the content believed to be important was provided to examine whether the 
concept of interest is activated. While situational information has been claimed to 
underlie the conceptual representation of abstract concepts (Barsalou, 1999, 2003, 2008; 
Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011) the current experiments were the first to establish that 
abstract concepts are activated by situational information – a finding that is crucially 
important for such theories. Across all experiments, abstract concepts were recognized 
faster when preceded by a related as opposed to an unrelated scenario. In addition, this 
effect was replicated in Experiment 2 with fewer items, further speaking to its robustness. 
On the surface at least, Experiment 2 indicates that situational information does 
not activate all types of abstract concepts. When abstract concepts are grouped into 
relational and internal states, the former showed significant priming but the latter did not. 
However, I believe this does not reflect situational knowledge as being unimportant for 
internal state concepts, but rather speaks to their inherent variability across individuals. 
Internal State Concepts 
According to recent insights on emotion concept processing referred to as the 
Conceptual Act Theory (Barrett et al., 2006; Wilson-Mendenhall et al., 2011), as a 
situation unfolds, agents, objects, actions, mental states, and so forth project onto 
concepts in parallel and compete for categorization. It is claimed that the situation is 
categorized first, and it is this categorization that produces an internal state. In effect, one 
must conceptualize danger (relational) before one feels fear (internal). 
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The correspondence, however, between how one conceptualizes a situation and 
the internal state it produces is arguably not one-to-one. While in some cases it may be 
more specific (e.g., danger likely produces fear), in others it is not (e.g., competition may 
produce excitement and confidence for some, and nervousness for others). In other words, 
it may be consistent that people recognize and conceptualize a scenario that involves 
playing a game with an opponent as competition, but the subjective internal state 
concept(s) that are activated are less consistent. Regarding priming experiments, if the 
target word is an internal state such as confidence, presumably it would only be primed 
for those who experience competition with confidence, or have experienced good 
outcomes from competitions in the past. And indeed, research has long recognized that 
people conceptualize situations differently. The link between the conceptual system and 
the internal states it drives has long been the basis of various psychological disorders 
such as phobias, and their treatment more generally (see Butler, et al., 2006, for review). 
Categorization 
Experiment 2 also highlights that the categorization of abstract concepts is an 
important venue for future research. Currently, there are no widely accepted categories of 
abstract concepts beyond the so-called emotion words. While it has been demonstrated 
that emotion words (words rated highly on valence and arousal) are special, such that 
when other factors are controlled for, they actually elicit shorter reaction times in 
behavioural studies than concrete concepts (Kousta et al., 2011), overall, abstract 
concepts are typically treated as belonging to one ubiquitous category. Presumably this is 
because they do not lend themselves well to categorization, or at any rate, much less so 
than concrete nouns, which have long been differentiated. 
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Experiment 2 suggests this is a worthwhile venture. Further, future attempts 
should go beyond sorting concepts in isolation using scales from rated dimensions. If I 
had taken this approach in Experiment 2, both relational and internal state concepts 
would belong to the same category, as they were matched on all available variables – 
including valence and arousal. Yet, it is clear that semantically they are very different and 
they led to different behavioural effects. 
If abstract concepts are represented by situations, it is perhaps more informative to 
group them based on the content they express. This type of approach has been used 
successfully to understand concrete concept categories by having people generate their 
features (Cree & McRae, 2003; Garrard et al., 2001; McRae et al., 2005; Vinson 
&Vigliocco, 2008). Analogously, treating situational content as features may produce 
insight into ways to how they can be grouped, and further, how these groups differ. 
The Role of Language 
The current thesis emphasizes the importance of real-world situational knowledge 
in representing abstract concepts. And indeed, the Conceptual Act Theory that motivated 
Experiment 2 does not refer to linguistic descriptions of scenarios but real-life 
experiences of them. However, I did not actually provide people with situational 
experiences but linguistic descriptions. It would be inaccurate to claim these are the 
precisely the same thing. However, the embodied nature of language suggests they do 
share parallels. People simulate experiences through words, and do so vividly. For 
example, Dils and Boroditsky (2010) demonstrated that when people are listening to 
motion language, the mental images they produce are vivid enough to evoke the motion 
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after effect (MAE), an illusion that produces direction-selective adaptation in the visual 
system. 
One advantage of using linguistically-described scenarios is that information can 
be included that could not be otherwise, such as the agent’s mental state, motives, and 
recent experiences. To illustrate, consider the situation, “In order to lose weight you’ve 
started a diet. You’re out for dinner and plan to order a salad. But you can’t take your 
eyes of their double-chocolate-fudge cake.” It would be incredibly challenging if not 
impossible to provide an experience (through movies or pictures) that would fully set up 
the situation and instill the agent’s motives. Nonetheless, it would be informative and 
important for future research to use non-linguistic primes such as pictures or videos to 
test whether abstract concepts are activated when they are primed with such stimuli. 
It is also true that emphasis was placed on moving away from a purely linguistic 
context towards one that incorporates real-world experience. I would like to point out that 
I do not in any way advocate for an impoverished role of language in the representation 
of abstract concepts. Rather, my intention was to emphasize that while concepts do not 
exist in a vacuum, neither does language. 
Language and experience occur in parallel. However, for abstract concepts, the 
linguistic environment has been viewed as primary, although it is undeniable that we use 
abstract concepts in scenarios we experience to describe and make sense of the world 
around us. This is an important consideration that has been overlooked in many cases, 
one that is at the core of Perceptual Symbol Systems theory (Barsalou, 1999), and one I 
believe should play a larger role in the future. Recent research has demonstrated that 
combining experiential data (information obtained from direct experience) and linguistic-
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based data (information obtained from language) adds computational power as compared 
to using either in isolation or independently (Andrews, Vigliocco, & Vinson, 2009). In 
essence, a more realistic way to look at how the semantics of a given concept are learned 
emphasizes the role of language and experience, as these two are interdependent during 
learning. 
Conclusion 
Overall, it is clear that theories emphasizing the importance of situational 
information in abstract concept representation are in need of continued research. The 
present experiments demonstrated that situational knowledge is connected to abstract 
concepts, so this preliminary finding holds promise to better understand them in the 
future. At any rate, it is clear that a new approach is warranted; comparing small selected 
subsets of abstract and concrete concepts has demonstrated that they do, indeed, differ, 
but has not led to a complete understanding of why, nor have these experiments provided 
a compelling explanation for what exactly the representational content of abstract 
concepts might be. 
Categorization has been extremely useful in understanding concrete concepts. For 
example, animals and tools show different, but relatively consistent patterns of activation 
across the cortex (Martin, 2007). These findings have provided insight into how we 
process and categorize them as well as why certain semantic deficits occur as a result of 
brain damage or degeneration (McRae & Cree, 2001; Lambon Ralph, Lowe, & Rogers, 
2007). However, such an approach has not been taken regarding abstract concepts. Often, 
they are selected from databases with little regard as to key ways in which they differ 
semantically. It may not be surprising then, that fMRI results have been so inconsistent. If 
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concrete concepts were treated as a single group for experimental purposes, similar 
inconsistencies would emerge. If we begin to view abstract concepts as relational 
structures that integrate or individuate aspects of situational information, it becomes clear 
that there are differences between them in terms of the type of information that is 
important and necessary. 
One such distinction made in the present experiment was between internal state 
and relational concepts. While it is clear that relational is a very broad category, it is an 
initial one upon which future research should build. It is plausible that some types of 
relations are more important for certain concepts than others (e.g., the distinction between 
agent and patient may be critical for advice or ignore but not truth). Further, to the extent 
that a concept refers to an internally experienced event, one should expect the external 
content that produces said internal state to be more variable across individual and 
subjectively dependent on experience. 
Finally, and importantly, the current research highlights the need for incorporating 
more realistic, context-driven paradigms for all concepts. As noted by Santos et al. 
(2011), shallow processing tasks that use single word presentation at rapid timing 
intervals may not reflect conceptual processing in real life, and may produce very 
different effects than more naturalistic paradigms. This is especially the case for abstract 
concepts for which meaning is largely dependent on situational context. 
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Appendix A 
Instructions for situation relatedness norming study. 
“This questionnaire requires you to read 3-sentence situations and rate various concepts 
based on how applicable they are to those situations, using a scale from 1 – 7. Concepts 
that are very relevant to the situation (i.e., you would experience this concept in the 
situation or use it to describe the situation) should be given a high rating (say, 6 or 7). 
Concepts that are not relevant in the situation (i.e., you would not experience this concept 
in the situation or use it to describe the situation) should be given a low rating (say 1 or 
2). Please try to use the entire scale. That is, please do not rate everything as either 1 or 
7.” 
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Appendix B 
Situations and abstract concepts targets used in Experiments 1 and 2. The first 16 items 
were the relational items, and the second 16 were the internal state items in Experiment 2. 
The final 16 items were used in Experiment 1 only. All items were used in Experiment 1. 
 
Number Situation Target 
Relational Items for Experiment 2 (1 – 16) 
 
 
 
1. 
 
School has been really difficult and stressful 
this year. You feel like maybe you should just 
give up and you want someone to talk to. You 
pick up your cell phone and call your best 
friend 
 
 
 
advice  
 
2. 
Everyday for lunch you go to subway. You 
order a 6” cold cut with lettuce, tomato, and 
mayo. You also get a small diet coke. 
 
 
habit 
 
3. 
You’re walking to get some food when you 
see a homeless man out of the corner of your 
eye. You don’t turn your head. You keep 
walking. 
 
 
ignore  
 
 
4. 
You’ve just gone grocery shopping and have 
your arms full of bags. You’re entering your 
apartment building and someone stops to hold 
the door for you. They offer to help you carry 
your bags. 
 
 
polite 
 
5. 
Your younger sister spills milk all over the 
kitchen floor. Your parents walk in and see 
the mess and your sister says she didn’t touch 
the milk. Your parents assumed it was you. 
 
 
blame 
 
 
 
6. 
You have recently entered a chess tournament 
through school. You are an experienced chess 
player and your first match is against a 
classmate who you have previously competed 
against and lost the title of defending 
champion to. Since then, you’ve been 
practicing and feel confident that this will be 
a close match. 
 
 
 
competition 
 60 
 
7. 
You just finished writing a test. It took you 
only half an hour. You barely studied but 
knew almost all of the answers. 
 
 
easy 
 
8. 
You and Quinn have known each other since 
childhood. You often get together to chat, to 
study and to go shopping. After graduation, 
you decide to go to the same university. 
 
 
friendship 
 
9. 
You reach in your pocket as you’re walking 
to class and find a dollar. You’re holding it 
but it slips from your hand. It rolls down into 
the gutter. 
 
 
gone  
 
 
10. 
You and one of your family members got in a 
big fight last week. You haven’t been talking 
much since then. When they call and ask you 
for a ride to an appointment, you refuse to 
drive them. 
 
 
grudge 
 
 
 
11. 
Your youngest son now wants to walk to the 
bus stop by himself. You’re reluctant but you 
decide to let him, just once. You watch from 
the front window as he carefully crosses the 
street and realize that he’s old enough to do 
this on his own. 
 
 
 
independence 
 
 
12. 
You are working on a paper in the library. 
The fire alarm goes off and everyone has to 
evacuate the building. It turns out that there 
was no fire, but the whole procedure took 
about a half an hour. 
 
 
 
interruption 
 
 
13. 
It’s Friday and a friend asks you to go 
downtown. You decide to join. You still have 
lots of work to do, but you’ve worked really 
hard all week. 
 
 
justify 
 
14. 
You’ve lost your phone. The funny thing is 
you just had it 10 minutes ago. You’ve 
retraced your steps but can’t find it anywhere. 
 
 
missing 
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15. Your roommate just got a new puppy. But she 
works all day and is hardly ever home. The 
puppy doesn’t get walked or fed enough and 
doesn’t seem very healthy. 
 
 
neglect 
 
 
16. 
As a kid, you had a bad experience with a dog 
and you were bitten. You’ve never liked dogs 
since. When dogs approach you, you retreat 
and your heart starts to race. 
 
 
phobia 
 
Internal State Items for Experiment 2 (17 – 32) 
 
17. 
Your favourite show starts again next week. 
It’s been off the air for way too long. Next 
Wednesday seems like a long way away. 
 
 
anticipation 
 
18. 
You’re in line for the bank. You realize your 
ex is standing in front of you. You make eye 
contact a few times but don’t say anything. 
 
 
awkward 
 
19. 
You’re taking the bus back home. You check 
the time. Your phone’s dying, you have 
nothing to read, and you’re not even tired. 
 
 
boredom 
 
20. 
You’re studying for a test. The textbook says 
one thing on the topic. However, the 
professor’s notes say another. 
 
 
confused 
 
 
21. 
You come home from work crying since 
you’ve had a really bad day. Nothing you do 
seems to be working out the way you want it 
to. You fall asleep crying and can’t seem to 
get out of bed the next morning. 
 
 
 
depressed 
 
 
22. 
You and your significant other had a messy 
breakup. They’ve been ignoring you. You 
decide to call them several times leaving 
multiple messages. 
 
 
 
desperate 
 
 
23. 
You just went out on a date with someone 
you have really strong feelings for. 
Everything went really well. But, it’s been a 
week and you haven’t heard anything from 
them. 
 
 
 
disappointed 
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24. 
You’ve applied to your dream job a week ago 
but haven’t heard back. You decide to call 
them. You just need to know either way. 
 
 
eager 
 
 
25. 
It’s Monday morning and you want a coffee 
from Tim Horton’s. You don’t bother 
changing your dirty pajamas. When you 
arrive, you see your boss. 
 
 
 
embarrassed 
 
 
 
26. 
You are walking through a neighbourhood 
that you don’t often go through. It’s a run-
down neighbourhood with graffiti and 
boarded-up houses and abandoned cars. You 
notice that a man seems to be following you, 
he’s starting to walk faster and you are the 
only two people on the street. 
 
 
 
 
fear 
 
 
27. 
You’re sitting at your computer trying to 
write an essay. You’ve been working on it for 
hours but can’t seem to get the words out. 
You keep rewriting the same three sentences. 
 
 
 
frustrated 
 
 
28. 
You’re working on a group project with 
another student. She’s really nice and does 
almost all of the work. Later you find out you 
received 15% higher than she did. 
 
 
 
guilt 
 
 
29. 
After many job applications, you have an 
interview. The position is highly desirable. 
It’s a bit of a long shot, but maybe you’ll get 
the job. 
 
 
 
hope 
 
 
30. 
You’ve just woken up. It’s Saturday morning 
and you have an exam at 10:00 a.m. 
However, you roll over to look at your clock 
and see that it’s 10:15. 
 
 
 
panic 
 
 
31. 
You’re walking home when you realize you 
don’t have your laptop. You must have left it 
at school. You run back and find it exactly 
where you left it. 
 
 
 
relief 
 
32. 
Your community soccer team needs a goalie 
so you try out. You’re excited about the 
prospect of playing. You get an email and 
your name isn’t on the list. 
 
upset 
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Items used in Experiment 1 Only (33 – 48)  
 
 
33. 
A friend invites you to his cottage. You hate 
heights, but a rite of passage is cliff jumping 
into the lake. You’re standing on the ledge 
and take the jump. 
 
 
 
brave 
 
 
34. 
A friend talks you into trying rock climbing. 
The two of you arrive and you find yourself 
staring up from the bottom of the wall. It’s a 
lot larger and steeper than you thought it 
would be. 
 
 
 
challenge 
 
 
35. 
It’s your first time babysitting for a 
neighbour. Everything’s going well until you 
check on the baby you put to bed an hour ago. 
She’s not there. 
 
 
crisis 
 
36. 
You are surfing for the first time. You 
decided to go alone. Today, the waves are 
very big and the tides are strong. 
 
 
danger 
 
 
37. 
You have a job at Wendy’s, but you’re 
looking for other work. You are not very 
happy at Wendy’s. You would like to do 
something more challenging and something 
that you are more interested in. 
 
 
 
dissatisfaction 
 
 
38. 
You’re working hard to finish a paper you’ve 
been writing. Your phone keeps vibrating. 
You can see it flashing out of the corner of 
your eye. 
 
 
distracted 
 
39. 
This morning, your parents left for a weekend 
getaway. You’ve just woken up from sleeping 
in. The place is all yours. 
 
 
freedom 
 
 
40. 
You were laid off from work two weeks ago. 
You haven’t told your spouse because you’re 
scared that the news will devastate them. You 
decide that tomorrow you will tell them what 
happened. 
 
 
 
hesitation 
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41. 
You don’t have anything to do today. You 
sleep in, then lie in bed for a while when you 
finally wake up. You get up slowly, eat 
breakfast, and decide not to get dressed all 
day. 
 
 
 
lazy 
 
 
42. 
A friend invites you to a card party. But when 
you arrive, you don’t know the game they’re 
playing. You find yourself sitting on a chair 
in the back of the room. 
 
 
 
lonely 
 
43. 
Last month you were offered a great job. 
Instead of taking it, you decided to wait. Now 
you work at McDonalds. 
 
 
regret 
 
44. 
Your little cousin is really annoying. She’s 
always kicking you and calling you names. 
You take her stuffed animal and hide it. 
 
 
revenge 
 
 
 
45. 
You are riding your bike home and get caught 
in a thunderstorm. The thunder is booming 
and the lightning struck a tree not that far 
away. You reach your home without getting 
hurt and you dry off and stand inside to watch 
the end of the storm. 
 
 
 
safety 
 
46. 
It’s your anniversary. You have a feeling that 
your partner of 3 years has forgotten. When 
you arrive home, there’s dinner on the table. 
 
 
surprise 
 
 
47. 
In order to lose weight, you’ve started a diet. 
You’re out for dinner and plan to order a 
salad. But you can’t take your eyes off their 
double chocolate fudge cake. 
 
 
 
temptation 
 
 
48. 
You’ve put a lot of effort into a group project 
for class. However, one of your members 
plagiarizes. Nevertheless, your professor 
gives you all a zero. 
 
 
unfair 
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Appendix C 
Instructions for Target Norming Study. 
Concreteness 
“This questionnaire requires you to read words referring to various concepts and rate 
them based on how concrete or abstract you find them to be. To illustrate, any word that 
refers to objects, materials, or persons should receive a high concreteness rating. In 
contrast, any word that refers to an abstract concept that cannot be experienced by the 
senses should receive a high abstractness rating. For example, "turtle," should be given a 
relatively high rating (say, 6 or 7), "chance" may be given a lower rating (say, 2 or 3), 
and "small" may be rated somewhere in the middle (say, 4).   Larger numbers indicate 
more concrete, whereas smaller numbers indicate more abstract. Please try to use the 
entire scale and indicate your response by filling in the appropriate bubble.” 
*Instructions taken from Paivio (1986). 
 
Imageability 
 
“This questionnaire requires you to read words referring to various concepts and rate 
them based on how imageable you find them to be. Any word which, in your estimation, 
very quickly and easily arouses a mental image (i.e., a mental picture, or sound, or other 
sensory experience) should be given a high imagery rating. In contrast, any word that 
arouses a mental image with difficulty or not at all should be given a low imagery rating. 
Larger numbers indicate more imageable concepts, whereas smaller numbers indicate less 
imageable concepts. For example, "circumstance," may be given a relatively low rating 
(say, 2 or 3), whereas "puppy" should be given a relatively high rating (say, 6 or 7). 
"Evolution," may be given a rating somewhere in between (say, 4).   Please try to use the 
entire scale and indicate your response by filling in the appropriate bubble.” 
*Instructions taken from Paivio (1986). 
 
Context Availability 
 
“Words differ on how easy it is to come up with a particular context or circumstance in 
which you might experience them. It is easy to think of a context for the word “baseball” 
and “emotion” but much harder to think of a context for the word “method” or “essence.” 
 66 
Rate the following words on the ease with which you can think of a context for each word 
on a scale from 1 to 7, where 1 means “very hard to think of a context,” and 7 means 
“very easy to think of a context.” In the above examples, it is easy to think of a context 
for the word “baseball” and “emotion” (I immediately think of the context of the World 
Series for “baseball,” and perhaps the context of falling in love for “emotion”). 
Therefore, these words might receive a rating of 6 or 7. In contrast, it is rather difficult to 
think of a context for the words “method” or “essence”. Although after some thought, I 
may be able to come up with an appropriate context, but because it was more difficult, 
these words might receive ratings of 1 or 2. Please try and use the full range of the scale.” 
*Instructions taken from Schwanenflugel and Shoben (1986). 
 
Familiarity 
 
“This questionnaire requires you to rate words based on how familiar you are with the 
concept or idea that the word refers to on a scale from 1 to 7. Concepts that you are very 
familiar with should receive a high rating (6 or 7) whereas concepts that you are not very 
familiar with should receive a low rating (1 or 2). Concepts you are somewhat familiar 
with should be rated in the mid-range (4 or 5). Please try to use the entire range of the 
scale.” 
 
Valence 
 
“The purpose of this questionnaire is to investigate emotion, and concerns how people 
respond to different types of words. Please rate the following concepts based on how 
positive (happy) or negative (sad) you find them to be on a scale from 1 to 9. At one 
extreme of this scale, you are happy, pleased, satisfied, contented, or hopeful. When you 
feel completely happy, you should indicate this by using the right-most bubble. The other 
end of the scale is when you feel completely unhappy, annoyed, unsatisfied, or depressed. 
You can indicate feeling completely unhappy by using the left-most bubble. You can also 
indicate intermediate feelings of pleasure, by using any of the other bubbles. If you feel 
completely neutral, neither happy nor sad, use the middle bubble (5). This permits you to 
make more finely graded ratings of how you feel in reaction to each word. Please try to 
use the entire range of the scale.” 
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*Instructions substantially modified from Lang (1980) 
 
Arousal 
“The purpose of this questionnaire is is to investigate emotion, and concerns how people 
respond to different types of words. In the last questionnaire you were asked to rate 
words based on how positive or negative they are. This time, please rate the following 
concepts based on arousal. At one extreme of this scale you are stimulated, excited, 
frenzied, jittery, wide-awake, or aroused. When you feel completely aroused, use the 
right-most bubble. If the word makes you feel completely relaxed, calm, sluggish, dull, 
sleepy, or unaroused, use the left-most bubble. You can represent intermediate levels of 
excitedness or calmness by using any of the other bubbles. If you are not excited nor at 
all calm (neutral), use the middle bubble (5). This permits you to make more finely 
graded ratings of how you feel in reaction to each word. There are a total of 9 possible 
bubbles along the rating scale so that you can indicate the extent to which you believe the 
concepts to be low or high arousal. Please try to use the entire range of the scale.” 
*Instructions heavily modified from Lang (1980). 
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Appendix D 
 
Instructions for Production Study 
 
The purpose of this experiment is to find out what people think about situations of 
various types. 
 
You will read a number of 3-sentence descriptions of situations. For each one, please 
immerse yourself in the situation, and then provide 2 (minimum) to 5 (maximum) words 
that you feel describe the situation in the order you deem most relevant. 
 
We would like you to provide words that refer to the emotions or feelings or thoughts of 
the people that are in each situation, or that sum up the situation as a whole. 
 
Here's an example situation that may elicit the following responses: 
"You're waiting in line for a ride at Canada's Wonderland. Your heart starts to race, your 
hands are shaking, and your knees feel weak. You debate whether or not you should turn 
back." 
 
1. Nervous 
 
2. Coward 
 
3. Scared 
 
4. Confused 
 
5. Dilemma 
 
Please note that we do NOT want you to provide names of things or types of people, or 
the physical activities that may be involved in the situation. 
 
So, for the above example, please do NOT provide responses like "roller coaster", 
"child", "flee", or "scream". 
 
When you are ready to begin, please progress to the next page. 
 
You may use the same words in multiple situations if you believe they apply. 
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